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ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POSTCONVICTION RELIEF PETITION

The state inadvertently makes a strong case as to why the district court
erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing. This is because in order to argue
that the summary dismissal should be affirmed, it had to submit and rely on
appendices hundreds of pages long which contained materials not considered by
the district court. In short,

the state does not really argue that the summary

dismissal was correct for the reasons pronounced by the district court (and it was
not).

Rather, it argues the summary dismissal should be affirmed based on

evidence and arguments never presented to or considered by the district court.
But in addition to these new arguments being wrong, they would also require this
Court to make legal and factual findings in the first instance.
For example, the state argues for the first time on appeal that defense
counsel successfully minimized the amount of evidence

regarding

Austin's

knowledge of the murder because the only evidence of it presented at trial
(besides Appellant's own statement) was the bare shed statement (I think my
mother killed my father)

and not the long version of what Adam Ketterling

claimed Austin said which appears in a police report. The state goes on to claim
that defense counsel excluded the long version,

but never explains how trial

counsel kept it out. The prosecution did not attempt to introduce the long version
at trial (and so it wasn't kept out via defense objection) and what's more, the
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prosecutor didn't even attempt to introduce the long version at the grand jury
where defense counsel obviously wasn't present to object.
The state then posits that defense counsel would not want to call Austin
as a witness since it would have opened the floodgates and he would have been
impeached with the long version of the shed statement which trial counsel
worked hard to exclude. But the state fails to explain how Austin could be
impeached with a police report detailing Adam Ketterling's statement to police,
and of course Austin could not be impeached with someone else's statement.
Further,

there is no showing that Adam Ketterling himself could or would

impeach Austin,

because Adam did not testify to the same statement as

contained in the police report at either the grand jury or the trial, but only to the
short version. Finally, even if Austin was impeached, his testimony still would not
do more harm than good because as it was (without him), the shed statement
could not be controverted.
Additionally, the state does not even attempt to dispute Appellant's point
that trial counsel could have used Austin's denial of the shed statement (along
with Amber's statements which confirm his movements and emotional state) to
have the court reconsider its ruling admitting the shed statement as an excited
utterance. Had the shed statement not have been admitted in the first place then
Austin would not need to testify before the jury and so whether or not he could
be impeached would not matter.
As to Amber, while the state now claims (it did not below) that

her

memory has improved since trial and that her sworn affidavit is inconsistent with
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her sworn trial testimony, this is a topic for the evidentiary hearing. Or at the very
least had the state made this argument below, Amber would have had the
opportunity to respond via affidavit and explain any inconsistencies.
For example, while Amber did testify at trial that she did not remember
seeing Austin when she went to her grandmother's house, the context of her
answer suggests that she was focused on who she saw when she arrived and
went in the house.

Her affidavit shows that when she realized the importance of

Austin's movements, she could

remember seeing him, not in the house, but

coming from the shed and on the back porch.
The state argues that eliciting a different version on day 20 of the trial than
she had testified to on day 7 was unlikely to be persuasive.
makes no sense because it is based on the fact that trial

This argument
counsel did not

conduct any cross examination of Amber because he would be calling her in the
defense case in chief.

However, had trial counsel been aware of what she

actually could testify to regarding her knowledge of Austin's movements or
emotions,

he would have immediately had her correct her testimony in cross

examination (or used it outside the presence of the jury while urging the court to
reconsider its excited utterance ruling) and not have waited 13 days. Further, a
contemporaneous correction of the testimony would not have been without value
since the jury was aware that no memory in the case was fresh since the trial
was occurring 4 ½ years after the murder.
Finally, it must be remembered that this was a motion for summary
disposition. While the state now picks nits about what Appellant did not prove
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with her affidavits, such as what trial counsel knew, whether trial counsel would
have interviewed Austin and Amber but for his belief the shed statement was
inadmissible, and whether

the decisions to not call Austin or ask Amber

particular questions were tactical, this level of proof is not required to merit an
evidentiary hearing. Rather, the petitioner needs only raise a material fact issue
to be entitled

to an evidentiary hearing. Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844

(Ct.App. 1994). At that time trial the power of the subpoena can require trial
counsel to appear in court and testify, as opposed to the earlier time when the
petition is being prepared.
the affidavits of

And Appellant here raised a material fact issue via

Austin and Amber that swore they would have testified to

matters that would have changed the outcome of the criminal case but were not
called by defense counsel and/or were not asked those questions by him.
To summarize, the district court in this case summarily dismissed the
petition, holding that no prejudice from any error of trial counsel was established
because Adam Ketterling had been thoroughly impeached at trial. This decision
was wrong

as

explained in Appellant's opening brief, and the state's new

arguments or evidence do not show otherwise.

Moreover, the state's new

arguments are not even correct, but in any event Appellant urges this Court to
reject the state's attempt to have it make factual and legal findings in the first
instance based on evidence not considered by the district court.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above and in Appellant's opening
brief, Appellant/Petitioner respectfully requests that the district court's summary
denial of the post conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be
remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this

f Ll ··Y'
f--L
day of January, 2013.
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